Introduction
Recently, digital contents with various kinds of logical structure are available, e.g., an interactive drama. When viewing an interactive drama, a list of choices is provided at each divergence point as a multiple-choice question and a plot of the delivered drama is changed based on which choices are made by the viewer. The contents provider can improve viewers' satisfaction by preparing the structure of an interactive drama such that a delivered plot reflects the viewer's personal preference or character. Thus, a delivery service for interactive dramas will be popular in the future because interactive contents are attractive for WWW users.
Possible plots of an interactive drama can be represented by a directed graph, called a plot graph in this paper. Each node of a plot graph denotes a scene of the interactive drama. Each arc of a plot graph has a label which represents a choice. An arc connects such nodes that one denotes a scene assigned a choice represented by the arc's label and the other denotes the following scene delivered when the choice is made. A plot of one story corresponds to a path of its plot graph from a node denotes an opening scene to * Presently, with the Matsushita Systems and Technology Co., Ltd.
a) E-mail: s-okamur@ist.osaka-u.ac.jp b) E-mail: maki-yos@ist.osaka-u.ac.jp c) E-mail: fujiwara@ist.osaka-u.ac.jp a node denotes an ending scene. If a contents provider allows a viewer to obtain scenes independently of a plot of an interactive drama, then the contents provider can prepare a complete directed graph as a plot graph. Therefore, we assume that a contents provider tries to control delivery such that each viewer's history of choices forms a path of its plot graph.
To improve viewers' satisfaction, a contents provider prepares a plot graph of an interactive drama such that each path is congenial to those who make choices on the path. For such interactive drama, anyone who can link choices made by the same viewer can collect the information on personal preference or character of each viewer. Viewer's concerns over privacy have become stronger lately. Many of viewers desire to prevent even the contents provider from linking which path is chosen by a viewer. Therefore, a delivery system for interactive dramas should guarantee that a contents provider can obtain enough information to control delivery according to its plot graph whereas he cannot link choices made by each viewer. In this paper, we focus on such delivery system.
In previous delivery systems protecting viewer's information about delivered contents, e.g., the anonymous fingerprinting schemes in [8] , [9] and the priced oblivious transfer schemes in [3] , delivery control according to a structure of contents is unnecessary and is not considered. Delivery control for an interactive drama is focused in [6] , [7] but the secrecy of the viewer's history of choices is not considered.
To design a delivery system, we consider interactive drama-specific requirements, called the accuracy of delivery control and the secrecy of the viewer's history of choices. First, we define a plot graph of an interactive drama, a delivery system for interactive dramas, and these two requirements. The accuracy of delivery is defined against a coalition of viewers so that there is no advantage of colluding, i.e., contents obtained by any coalition can be obtained by an honest viewer who is delivered several plots. The secrecy of the viewer's history of choices is defined against a contents provider so that the contents provider cannot link choices of a viewer. Then, a delivery system which satisfies these requirements is proposed. We consider the situation that there are many viewers, and aim to decrease the communication complexity of each delivery. The proposed system is constructed using a partially blind signature scheme [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] . Any secure partially blind signature scheme can be used for the proposed system. We do not treat a pay interCopyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers active drama such as a viewer is charged based on the number of delivered contents. To construct a delivery system for a pay interactive drama at lower cost, where charging is done satisfying an unlinkability of each viewer's choice, it is necessary to introduce a trusted third party. By using the trusted third party, an unlinkable delivery system can be constructed easily. However, we aim to construct a delivery system on weaker assumptions. It is more desirable that no trusted third party is necessary. Therefore, we restrict to free or fixed charge interactive dramas and construct a delivery system in which there is no trusted third party.
In Section 2, we show an example of the interactive drama and a definition of a plot graph. In Section 3, we give a model of a delivery system for interactive dramas and security requirements of the delivery system. The proposed system is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate the security and the complexity of the proposed system.
Interactive Drama

An Example of Interactive Drama
We show an example of the interactive drama. In this example, all viewers see the same opening scene, however one of two different ending scenes can be viewed according to the viewer's history of choices.
Component content 1 (the opening scene):
A hero enters a cave to seek a treasure. The hero sees monsters attacking a man.
[The list of choices]
• The hero helps the man. → Component content 2 is delivered.
• The hero ignores the man.
→ Component content 3 is delivered.
Component content 2:
The hero defeats the monsters, but the hero's money is stolen by the man. The hero goes on and sees monsters attacking the same man.
• The hero helps the man. → Component content 4 is delivered.
→ Component content 5 is delivered.
Component content 3:
The hero goes around searching for the treasure in the cave.
• The viewer sees the subsequent scene. → Component content 5 is delivered.
Component content 4 (an ending scene):
The hero defeats the monsters, is given the treasure from the man, and leaves the cave. Component content 5 (an ending scene): The hero cannot find the treasure and leaves the cave.
There are three plots in this drama, i.e., 1 → 2 → 4, 1 → 2 → 5 and 1 → 3 → 5, where the numbers are the component content numbers. A delivery of this drama is controlled such that each viewer obtains only component contents belong to one of the plots. Therefore, a viewer who is delivered component contents 1 and 2, cannot obtain component content 3. If the choices of a viewer are known to the contents provider, then there is possibility that the contents provider will regard the viewer who selects 1 → 2 → 4 as an easy mark because the viewer helped the same man twice despite that the hero's money was stolen before.
Plot Graph of Interactive Drama
An interactive drama consists of some component contents and some choices. Component contents are divided into two groups. A component content in one group is assigned one or more choices, and that in the other group is assigned no choice. If only one choice is assigned, the following component content is unique. If several choices are assigned, there is the unique following component content for each choice. If no choice is assigned, there is no next component content. We call a component content delivered to all viewers first an opening component content and call a component content assigned no choice an ending component content.
In a general interactive drama, the same opening component content is delivered to all viewers but an ending component content delivered to a viewer depends on choices made by the viewer. Therefore, we assume that there is only one opening component content, whereas there are several ending component contents in an interactive drama.
For an interactive drama, let n and c i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n be the number of component contents and a component content numbered i, respectively. Let l and a j with 1 ≤ j ≤ l be the number of all choices contained in the interactive drama and a choice numbered j, respectively. Let choice(i) ⊆ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l } be the set of choices assigned to c i . For the interactive drama, we define a plot graph, which represents all the possible plots, by a pair of a labeled directed graph (N, L, E) and c open as follows: For example, the plot graph of the interactive drama in Section 2.1 is shown in Fig. 1 where c i is component content i, c open = c 1 and a 1 , a 2 and a 3 are "The hero helps the man.," "The hero ignores the man." and "The viewer sees the subsequent scene.," respectively. 
Delivery System for Interactive Drama
Model of Delivery System
In a delivery system for interactive dramas, there are the following two types of participants. Contents provider: A contents provider has interactive dramas, and delivers one from the opening component content based on each viewer's choices. He allows a viewer to obtain the opening component content any times. He controls delivery in such a way that a viewer obtains one plot for one delivery of the opening component content. Viewer: At each delivery, a viewer obtains a component content with a list of choices assigned to it. He can only request the opening component content at the first delivery. Once he obtains the opening component content, he can request one of the following component contents. He makes a choice from the list, sends the choice to the contents provider, and is delivered the following component content corresponds to the choice. Whenever he wants to obtain new plot, he requests the opening component content.
A protocol of a delivery system consists of the following two phases. Initialization phase: This phase is executed once when a participant, a contents provider or a viewer, joins in a delivery. A participant who joins in a delivery generates keys for cryptographic schemes used in the system and publishes public keys. 
Security Requirements
In this section, we give security requirements of a delivery system for interactive dramas. Requirements common to other contents delivery systems, e.g., only the requesting viewer can obtain contents and a viewer who redistributes obtained contents is traceable, can be satisfied by employing the same techniques as in other systems. Therefore, we focus on specific requirements for a delivery system for interactive dramas.
Accuracy of Delivery
In this section, we define a security requirement for the accuracy of delivery. We assume that a contents provider allows a viewer to be delivered the opening component content twice or more times.
For an interactive drama with a plot graph PG = (N, L, E, c open ), at every delivery, a history of choices made by each viewer should form a set of paths of PG from c open to some component contents. Some viewer tries to obtain such a set of component contents that there is no set of paths to obtain them, e.g., to obtain all ending component contents by obtaining the opening component content only once. Moreover, such viewer colludes with other viewers to reach his malicious goal. We define the security requirement against any coalition of viewers. This requirement means that any collusion has no advantage and any viewer can only follow k plots if the viewer obtains the opening component content k times.
Secrecy of the Viewer's History of Choices
For an interactive drama with PG = (N, L, E, c open ), it is known that each viewer's history of choices forms a set of paths in the graph (N, L, E) from c open to some component contents. The contents provider tries to obtain additional information on a viewer who made a choice, called the target viewer, and colludes with some viewers except for the target viewer. There are two ways of defining the security requirement: Preventing the contents provider from knowing which choice is made at each delivery; and preventing the contents provider from linking choices made by the same viewer while allowing the contents provider to know which choice is made.
We aim to define the security requirement for the situation that many viewers request component contents of the same interactive drama. In such situation, the transmission complexity should be decreased because the contents provider should respond to many requests. If the former way is adopted, exchanged data between the contents provider and the requested viewer at each delivery should depend on all the component contents or the number of all component contents. Such transmission is inefficient. If the latter way is adopted, the exchanged data at each delivery depends on a requested component content but not all the component contents. That is, the latter way is more efficient than the former. Therefore, we adopt the latter way of defining the requirement.
It should be noted that the contents provider can obtain additional information on the choice of a viewer for the trivial cases described below, when we adopt the latter way. However, we can say that these trivial cases do not occur very often in the situation considered here. The trivial cases are as follows: To realize such control, a contents provider issues a distinct signature on a pair of the content number of the delivered component content and a signature identification number to a viewer at a response of each delivery. The signature is an evidence that the viewer obtained the component content. When the viewer requests a next component content on a path, the viewer shows the signature on the content number of the component content delivered last on the path. If the signature has not been shown to the contents provider before, it is ensured that the viewer has been obtained the corresponding component content and did not request any next component content of the component content before.
Proposed System
On the other hand, to satisfy Requirement 2, above control must be realized satisfying the unlinkability of choices made by viewers, i.e., a contents provider must be able to control delivery without knowledge of each viewer's history of choices. To make each viewer's choices unlinkable, every viewer randomly selects a signature identification number by himself and sends such data that a contents provider can know the content number but cannot know the signature identification number from. To realize this idea, a partially blind signature scheme [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] is used in the proposed system.
Cryptographic Schemes
In the proposed system, the following cryptographic schemes are used: Symmetric key encryption scheme, Public key encryption scheme, and Partially blind signature scheme. In this section, we show their models and notations. (a) Symmetric key encryption scheme A symmetric key encryption scheme consists of key generation algorithm S KG, encryption algorithm ES and decryption algorithm DS .
• S KG outputs a symmetric key sk.
• ES takes sk and a plaintext pt as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext of pt encrypted with sk, denoted ES (sk, pt).
• DS takes sk and a ciphertext ct as inputs, and outputs a plaintext of ct decrypted with sk, denoted DS (sk, ct).
(b) Public key encryption scheme A public key encryption scheme consists of key generation algorithm PKG, encryption algorithm EP and decryption algorithm DP.
• PKG outputs an encryption key ek and a decryption key dk.
• EP takes ek and a plaintext pt as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext of pt encrypted with ek, denoted EP(ek, pt).
• DP takes dk and a ciphertext ct as inputs, and outputs a plaintext of ct decrypted with dk, denoted DP(dk, ct).
(c) Partially blind signature scheme A partially blind signature scheme, e.g., [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] , allows a user to obtain a signature on a message and a common information which is agreed by the user and a signer, such that the signer does not get any information on the message nor on the resulting signature. A partially blind signature scheme consists of key generation algorithm BKG, signature issuing protocol BS and verification algorithm BV.
• BKG outputs a signing key bsk and a corresponding public key bvk.
• BS is an interactive protocol between a signer and a user. Their common inputs are the signer's public key bvk and a common information in f o. The private input of the signer is his signing key bsk, and that for the user is a message m. The user's output is a signature on (in f o, m), denoted BS (bsk, (in f o, m) ).
• BV takes bvk, in f o, m and a signature bs as inputs, and outputs true if bs = BS (bsk, (in f o, m) ) holds, otherwise f alse.
A partially blind signature scheme is said to be secure if it satisfies three requirements, completeness, partial blindness, and unforgeability [2] .
Partial blindness: The following two properties are satisfied.
1. A signer assures that an issued signature contains the agreed common information, and none can remove the common information from the signature. 2. For the same common information, a signer cannot link a signature to the instance of the signature issuing protocol in which the corresponding blind signature is issued.
Unforgeability: For each in f o, let l in f o be the number of executions of the signature issuing protocol for that in f o. There is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary who can compute l in f o + 1 signatures on in f o with non-negligible probability.
Assumptions
The proposed system assumes the following conditions.
• The used cryptographic schemes (i.e., a symmetric key encryption scheme, a public key encryption scheme and a partially blind signature scheme) are secure. 
Protocol
(1) Initialization phase A contents provider P runs the key generation algorithms BKG and PKG to obtain the following keys.
• A signing key bsk P and a corresponding public key bvk P for a partially blind signature scheme.
• An encryption key ek P and a decryption key dk P for a public key encryption scheme.
bvk P and ek P are published.
(2) Delivery phase One component content is delivered at each delivery. Before t-th delivery of a viewer V, V runs the key generation algorithm S KG to obtain a symmetric key sk Vt for encryption by P and chooses a signature identification number bn Vt from a domain of a message of the used partially blind signature scheme at random. (2-1) The first delivery from P to V (2-1-a) Request 1. V encrypts "First request"||sk V1 with the public encryption key ek P of P and obtains its ciphertext ct V1 = EP(ek P ,"First request"||sk V1 ), where "||" denotes the concatenation. 2. V sends ct V1 to P. 3. P decrypts the received ciphertext ct V1 and obtains DP(dk P , ct V1 ) ="First request"||sk V1 .
(2-1-b) Response 1. P encrypts the opening component content c 1 and choice(1) with the symmetric key sk V1 and obtains its ciphertext ct P1 = ES (sk V1 , c 1 ||choice (1)), and sends ct P1 to V. 2. P issues a signature on the content number of c 1 , i.e., 1, by running BS with V on their common input bvk = bvk P , in f o = 1, P's private input bsk = bsk P and V's private input m = bn V1 . Data sent to P and V are encrypted with ek P and sk V1 , respectively. As a result, V obtains a signature bs V1 = BS (bsk P , (1, bn V1 )). This means that V obtains evidence that c 1 has been delivered to V. 3. V decrypts the received ciphertext ct P1 and obtains DS (sk V1 , ct P1 ) = c 1 ||choice (1), and verifies that BV(bvk P , (1, bn V1 ), bs V1 ) = true holds.
(2-2) The t-th delivery from P to V with t ≥ 2 We assume that V obtains a component content c u at the (t − 1)-th delivery and selects a ∈ choice(u) for the t-th delivery. Therefore, V is delivered a component content c w with (c u , c w , a) ∈ E at the t-th delivery. Let bs Vt−1 = BS (bsk P , (u, bn Vt−1 )) be a signature issued by P through BS between P and V at the (t − 1)-th delivery. (2-2-a) Request 1. V generates the t-th request req t = a||u||bn Vt−1 ||bs Vt−1 || sk Vt . 2. V encrypts req t with the public encryption key ek P of P and obtains its ciphertext ct Vt = EP(ek P , req t ), and sends ct Vt to P. 3. P decrypts the received ciphertext ct Vt and obtains the request DP(dk P , ct Vt ) = req t = a||u||bn Vt−1 ||bs Vt−1 || sk Vt . 4. P confirms that the last delivered component content to V is c u if and only if BV(bvk P , (u, bn Vt−1 ), bs Vt−1 ) = true holds and bs t−1 has not been received before. 5. P stores the request req t .
(2-2-b) Response 1. P generates a response res t = c w ||choice(w)||w. 2. P encrypts res t with the symmetric key sk Vt and obtains its ciphertext ct Pt = ES (sk Vt , res t ), and sends ct Pt to V. 3. P issues a signature on the content number of c w , i.e., w, by running BS with V on their common input bvk = bvk P , in f o = w, P's private input bsk = bsk P and V's private input m = bn Vt . Data sent to P and V are encrypted with ek P and sk Vt , respectively. As a result, V obtains a signature bs Vt = BS (bsk P , (w, bn Vt )).
This means that V obtains evidence that c w has been delivered to V. 4. V decrypts the received ciphertext ct Pt and obtains the response DS (sk Vt , ct Pt ) = res t = c w ||choice(w)||w, and verifies that BV(bvk P , (w, bn Vt ), bs Vt ) = true holds.
Evaluation
Security
In this section, we prove that the proposed system satisfies each requirement on the assumptions in Section 4.3.
Theorem 1:
After every delivery to any viewer who may collude with other viewers and obtains the opening component content k times with k ≥ 1, there are k paths of a plot graph from the opening component content to some component contents where the set of component contents on the k paths equals the set of component contents obtained by the viewer. That is, Requirement 1 is satisfied in the proposed system.
Proof:
To prove that the proposed system satisfies Requirement 1, we prove that the following statement P(n, k) is true for any positive integer n and k ≤ n by induction: P(n, k) : After n-th delivery to a viewer V who may collude with other viewers and has obtained the opening component content k times from a contents provider P,
• there are k paths from the opening component content to some component contents where a set of component contents on the k paths equals a set of component contents which V and colluding viewers obtain, and
* be the k paths, and V and colluding viewers have k signatures on c π θ with 1 ≤ θ ≤ k which have not been sent to P.
Basis
At the first delivery, i.e., n = 1, V requests the opening component content c open , i.e., k = 1. After this delivery, V and colluding viewers obtain a component content on a path From the inductive hypothesis that P(n , k ) is true, P(n + 1, k + 1) is also true. Next, we show that P(n + 1, k ) is true. If V requests one of other component contents, V must send one of choices a µ ∈ choice(π θ ) where c π θ ∈ {c π 1 , c π 2 , . . . , c π k } and the signature on c π θ which have not been sent to P because of unforgeability of the signatures. After this delivery, V and colluding viewers obtain the following component content of c π θ and a signature on it. w θ is renewed by w θ a µ c π θ and c π θ is renewed by the obtained component content. Therefore, after this delivery, there are k paths and V has k signatures on c π θ with 1 ≤ θ ≤ k which have not been sent to P. From the inductive hypothesis that P(n , k ) is true, P(n + 1, k ) is also true.
By induction, P(n, k) with k ≤ n is true for every positive integer n and k ≤ n.
Theorem 2:
For every two choices sent to P, P cannot decide whether the choices are made by the same viewer except in the trivial cases, i.e., Requirement 2 is satisfied.
Proof: P can identify the next component content from a choice and a component content number of the last delivered one which are included in a message sent by a viewer. There is possibility that P can find out that two messages are sent by the same viewer when a content number of the last delivered component content included in one message and a content number of the next component content identified from the other are the same. On the assumption that a partially blind signature scheme is secure, P cannot get any information on the signature identification number nor on the resulting signature when issuing the signature. Therefore, if there are several messages which include the same number as a content number of the last delivered component content or the same number identified as a content number of the next component content from, then P cannot pinpoint the messages sent by the same viewer. The other parts of the message are clearly unavailable to link different messages. Therefore, P cannot decide whether two different messages have been sent by the same viewer or not.
Complexity
In this section, we evaluate the complexities on memory space, computation and communication of the proposed system.
First, we show the space complexities of a contents provider P and a viewer V. Let t P and n c be the number of all delivery by P and the maximum number of choices assigned to a component content, respectively. The amount of memory required for P is O(t P ) since P should store all received signatures and the size of a signature is constant. The amount of memory required for V is independent of t P and is O(n c ) since V should store a signature and a list of choices only for the last delivered component content and the size of a list of choices is O(n c ).
Next, we show the complexities on computation and communication at every delivery. These complexities are independent of t P and n c , and are constant. The details are as follows. P runs algorithms DP twice, ES twice, and BS once, respectively. V runs algorithms EP twice, DS twice, BS once, and BV once, respectively. Generally, BS has the highest computational complexity among these algorithms. Even if an efficient provably secure partially blind signature scheme in [2] is used, a modular exponentiations modulo a large modulus is executed nine times in BS . In communication between P and V, they send a ciphertext to each other and run BS once. In BS of the partially blind signature scheme in [2] , the amount of communication is at most about seven times as much as the size of a signature message and the number of communications is three times.
Last, to evaluate the overhead to satisfy an unlinkability of viewer's choice, we compare the complexity of the proposed system with that of a delivery system only satisfying the accuracy of delivery. We consider the following straightforward delivery system which minimize the amount of memory required for P:
• For each viewer, P stores the content number of the component content delivered last to a viewer V, and the component content to be delivered to V is selected based on this information and a choice sent from V.
• To prevent a viewer from pretending to be another viewer, P beforehand obtains each viewer's signature verification key at the first delivery and requires a viewer to attach his signature to his choice.
We note that in the proposed system anyone cannot pretend to be another viewer because P requires V to send a signature which is issued by P and only V knows. In this straightforward system, except that the space complexity of P is not O(t P ) but proportional to the number of viewers, other complexities depend on the same value as the value in the proposed system. We consider that it is difficult to reduce the space complexity of the proposed system to that of the above straightforward system while satisfying both the accuracy of delivery and the unlinkability of each viewer's choice. To reduce the complexity means to be enable P to use one datum for verify a number of request messages from viewers. In the straightforward system, each viewer's signature verification key plays the role of the datum. To be able to use one datum for verifying a number of request messages implies that P can know the messages have some relation each other. If the messages have the relation that they are generated by the same viewer, we can say that P can link choices of the viewer. Therefore, they have another relation. Since every viewer requests independently of another viewer, it is difficult to make some dependency between a request message generated by one viewer and that generated by another viewer, and to verify the two messages by the same one datum without reducing security. Therefore, we consider that P should store data of which amount is proportional to t P in order to satisfy both the accuracy of delivery and the unlinkability of each viewer's choice.
The actual amount of computation and communication in the proposed system is more than that in the straightforward system and is determined by the used partially blind signature scheme. Since any secure partially blind signature scheme can be used, if a more efficient partially blind signature scheme is proposed, the actual amount becomes closer to that in the straightforward system.
Conclusion
We have introduced unlinkable delivery for an interactive drama and proposed an unlinkable delivery system. As the unlinkable delivery, we have defined a plot graph of an interactive drama, a delivery system for interactive dramas, and security requirements of the delivery system for controlling delivery and protecting viewer's privacy. In the proposed system, viewer's choices are unlinkable and delivery of an interactive drama is controlled accurately according to its plot graph. To satisfy the unlinkability of viewer's choice, the delivery control is realized using a partially blind signature scheme. Moreover, we have evaluated security and complexity of the proposed system. It is proved that the unlinkability of viewer's choice and the accuracy of delivery control are guaranteed in the proposed system on the assumption that the used cryptographic schemes are secure. In the proposed system, the amount of memory required for a contents provider is proportional to the number of all delivery by the contents provider and the amount of memory required for a viewer depends on the maximum number of choices assigned a component content. However, the complexities on computation and communication are constant. To reduce memory required for a contents provider, it is considered that new specialized cryptographic schemes for a delivery of interactive drama are necessary whereas a general cryptographic scheme is used in the proposed system.
